USA v. Negron by unknown
2003 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-12-2003 
USA v. Negron 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Negron" (2003). 2003 Decisions. 276. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/276 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2003 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________________________
No.  01-3789
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ROBERT NEGRON,
Appellant
___________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 01-cr-00278)
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson
____________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 3, 2003
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and BECKER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 11, 2003)
__________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
Robert Negron has appealed from a judgment in a criminal case pursuant to his
bargained for plea of guilty to a charge of being a convicted felon in possession of a
firearm.  18 U.S.C. § (g)(1) and (2).  Negron’s counsel, Philip J. Moran, has filed a brief
2pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), accompanied by a “Motion of
Request to be Relieved as Counsel,” and by a certification in support of the motion and of
the Anders brief, containing 36 paragraphs and concluding that there are no non-frivolous
issues for appeal.  The brief refers to those portions of the record that might arguably
support an appeal and to the relevant law.  The affidavit goes into detail as to every aspect
of the case, both the guilt and sentencing phase.
As a general rule, the entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of virtually all
possible claims for appellate relief except (1) a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction to
accept the plea; (2) a claim that the plea is invalid, according to applicable constitutional
and statutory standards; and (3) a claim that the sentence is illegal.  See United States v.
Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989), Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).  Since a guilty
plea constitutes an admission that the defendant committed the charged crimes, any claim
that is inconsistent with an admission of guilt generally is waived by the plea.  See Broce,
488 U.S. at 570-75.  The guilty plea colloquy conducted by the District Court was
extensive and in conformity with the requisites of Rule 11(c) of the Fed. R. Crim. P.  We
need not describe the colloquy in detail.  Suffice it to say that each of the requirements of
Rule 11(c) were amply covered, including establishing the factual basis for the plea. 
Counsel’s certification, which sets forth his independent investigation, confirms the
factual basis.  He also confirms his review of the presentence report and states that there
is no basis for objection to the calculation of the base offense level or application of the
3upward adjustment because the weapon was defaced.  (A serial number was obliterated.)
He also represents that he finds no basis for additional downward adjustments (additional
to three levels for acceptance of responsibility).
Inter alia,  Mr. Moran’s certification states:
31.  Finally I have attempted to sit and look at the entirety of Robert
Negron’s situation and my involvement.  Mindful that I need argue every non-
frivolous issue, even those that appear unsupported by current law or reasonable
analogy.
32.  I have reviewed again Anders requirements, and have found
solace in Justice Stewart’s decent [sic] and note the inherently “quixotic”
nature of the undertaking.  In truth, in this case, I believe requiring a brief to
be the logical equivalent of ordering me to balance an egg on its edge.
33.  In addition to analyzing each segment or discernable part of this
process, I have also attempted to take each Constitutional Amendment that
might offer some solace to a defendant, and try to find an arguable basis
there for appeal.  I have considered the Second Amendment, I have
considered the Fourth Amendment, I have considered the Fifth Amendment,
I have considered the Sixth Amendment and I have considered the broadest
implications of the Fourteenth Amendment but I have found nothing upon
which Mr. Negron’s hat might rest.
34.  I have examined the underlying statute and compared its
required elements to the facts offered at the time of the plea.  I have
examined the Statute in terms of its constitutional foundation.  I am aware
of the prior decision of this Court in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d
196 (3d Cir. 2001).  This is a controlling precedent.  Notwithstanding that, I
find an arguable discordance with my reading of the decision in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).  However, my
research shows that although at least 9 other Courts of Appeals have
considered this issue, none has found this statute unconstitutional.  I have
nevertheless briefly, briefed this issue.
35.  I recognize that this Court wants a Brief.  Heretofore, I believed
    1While Mr. Moran was dilatory in fulfilling his Anders obligations, and it took some
effort by the Court to get him to complete them, he ultimately did so.  Mr. Moran’s
dilatoriness does not affect the outcome of the case.  We also note our view that, because
the issues presented in the appeal lack legal merit, they do not require the filing of a
petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  3d Cir. LAR 109.2(b)(2000).
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that any good attorney could surely always find something to argue about in
every case.  Here, however, I am defeated.
Pursuant to these comments, Mr. Moran’s brief seeks to establish a basis for
constitutional challenge to § 922(g).  His efforts fail, particularly in light of our decision
in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2001).
In United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 2000) we reconfirmed the duty
of counsel filing Anders briefs to attempt to uncover the best arguments for his or her
client, and to explain the faults in possible arguments.  We have examined the scant
record in this case, but find nothing that would require counsel to do more than he has
already.  He fairly represents that the Rule 11 colloquy passes muster.  The sentence was
not flawed.  The statute of conviction is constitutional.  The case is essentially
straightforward and there do not appear to be any other issues that might be the subject of
possible appeal.  Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.  We
deny Mr. Negron’s motion for the appointment of new counsel.  We grant Mr. Moran’s
motion to withdraw.1 
5/s/   Edward R. Becker                              
Circuit Judge
